

# INTERNATIONAL STANDARD

## NORME INTERNATIONALE



**Security for industrial automation and control systems –  
Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components**

**Sécurité des systèmes d'automatisation et de commande industrielles –  
Partie 4-2: Exigences de sécurité technique des composants IACS**



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INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

SECURITY FOR INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS –

Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components

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The text of this International Standard is based on the following documents:

FDIS	Report on voting
65/735/FDIS	65/740/RVD

Full information on the voting for the approval of this International Standard can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This document has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

A list of all parts in the IEC 62443 series, published under the general title *Security for industrial automation and control systems*, can be found on the IEC website.

Future standards in this series will carry the new general title as cited above. Titles of existing standards in this series will be updated at the time of the next edition.

The committee has decided that the contents of this document will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC website under "<http://webstore.iec.ch>" in the data related to the specific document. At this date, the document will be

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- withdrawn,
- replaced by a revised edition, or
- amended.

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## INTRODUCTION

### 0.1 Overview

Industrial automation and control system (IACS) organizations increasingly use commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) networked devices that are inexpensive, efficient and highly automated. Control systems are also increasingly interconnected with non-IACS networks for valid business reasons. These devices, open networking technologies and increased connectivity provide an increased opportunity for cyber-attack against control system hardware and software. That weakness may lead to health, safety and environmental (HSE), financial and/or reputational consequences in deployed control systems.

Organizations choosing to deploy business information technology (IT) cyber security solutions to address IACS security may not fully comprehend the results of their decision. While many business IT applications and security solutions can be applied to IACS, they should be applied in an appropriate way to eliminate inadvertent consequences. For this reason, the approach used to define system requirements is based on a combination of functional requirements and risk assessment, often including an awareness of operational issues as well.

IACS security countermeasures should not have the potential to cause loss of essential services and functions, including emergency procedures (IT security countermeasures, as often deployed, do have this potential). IACS security goals focus on control system availability, plant protection, plant operations (even in a degraded mode) and time-critical system response. IT security goals often do not place the same emphasis on these factors; they may be more concerned with protecting information rather than physical assets. These different goals should be clearly stated as security objectives regardless of the degree of plant integration achieved. A key step in the risk assessment, as required by IEC 62443-2-1<sup>1</sup> [1]<sup>2</sup>, should be the identification of which services and functions are truly essential for operations (for example, in some facilities engineering support may be determined to be a non-essential service or function). In some cases, it may be acceptable for a security action to cause temporary loss of a non-essential service or function, unlike an essential service or function that should not be adversely affected.

This document provides the cyber security technical requirements for the components that make up an IACS, specifically the embedded devices, network components, host components and software applications. Annex A describes categories of devices commonly used in IACSs. This document derives its requirements from the IACS system security requirements described in IEC 62443-3-3. The intent of this document is to specify security capabilities that enable a component to mitigate threats for a given security level (SL) without the assistance of compensating countermeasures. Annex B provides a table that summarizes the SLs of each of the requirements and requirement enhancements defined in this document.

The primary goal of the IEC 62443 series is to provide a flexible framework that facilitates addressing current and future vulnerabilities in IACS and applying necessary mitigations in a systematic, defensible manner. It is important to understand that the intention of the IEC 62443 series is to build extensions to enterprise security that adapt the requirements for business IT systems and combines them with the unique requirements for strong integrity and availability needed by IACS.

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<sup>1</sup> Many documents in the IEC 62443 series are currently under review or in development.

<sup>2</sup> Numbers in square brackets refer to the bibliography.

## 0.2 Purpose and intended audience

The IACS community audience for this document is intended to be asset owners, system integrators, product suppliers, and, where appropriate, compliance authorities. Compliance authorities include government agencies and regulators with the legal authority to perform audits to verify compliance with governing laws and regulations.

System integrators will use this document to assist them in procuring control system components that make up an IACS solution. The assistance will be in the form of helping system integrators specify the appropriate security capability level of the individual components they require. The primary standards for system integrators are IEC 62443-2-1 [1], IEC 62443-2-4 [3], IEC 62443-3-2 [5]<sup>3</sup> and IEC 62443-3-3 that provide organizational and operational requirements for a security management system and guide them through the process of defining security zones for a system and the target security capability levels (SL-T) for those zones. Once the SL-T for each zone has been defined, components that provide the necessary security capabilities can be used to achieve the SL-T for each zone.

Product suppliers will use this document to understand the requirements placed on control system components for specific security capability levels (SL-C) of those components. A component may not provide a required capability itself but may be designed to integrate with a higher-level entity and thus benefit from that entity's capability – for example an embedded device may not be maintaining a user directory itself, but may integrate with a system wide authentication and authorization service and thus still meet the requirements to provide individual user authentication, authorization and management capabilities. This document will guide product suppliers as to which requirements can be allocated and which requirements should be native in the components. As defined in Practice 8 of IEC 62443-4-1, the product supplier will provide documentation on how to properly integrate the component into a system to meet a specific SL-T.

The component requirements (CRs) in this document are derived from the system requirements (SRs) in IEC 62443-3-3. The requirements in IEC 62443-3-3 are referred to as SRs, which are derived from the overall foundational requirements (FRs) defined in IEC 62443-1-1. CRs may also include a set of requirement enhancements (REs). The combination of CRs and REs is what will determine the target security level that a component is capable of.

This document provides component requirements for four types of components: software application, embedded device, host device and network device. Thus, the CRs for each type of component will be designated as follows:


- Software application requirements (SAR);
- Embedded device requirements (EDR);
- Host device requirements (HDR); and
- Network device requirements (NDR).

The majority of the requirements in this document are the same for the four types of components and are thus designated simply as a CR. When there are unique component-specific requirements then the generic requirement will state that the requirements are component-specific and are located in the component-specific requirements clauses of this document.

Figure 1 shows a graphical depiction of the IEC 62443 series when this document was written.

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<sup>3</sup> Under preparation. Stage at the time of publication: IEC PRVC 62443-3-2:2018.



IEC

Figure 1 – Parts of the IEC 62443 series

## SECURITY FOR INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS –

### Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components

#### 1 Scope

This part of IEC 62443 provides detailed technical control system component requirements (CRs) associated with the seven foundational requirements (FRs) described in IEC TS 62443-1-1 including defining the requirements for control system capability security levels and their components, SL-C(component).

As defined in IEC TS 62443-1-1 there are a total of seven foundational requirements (FRs):

- a) identification and authentication control (IAC),
- b) use control (UC),
- c) system integrity (SI),
- d) data confidentiality (DC),
- e) restricted data flow (RDF),
- f) timely response to events (TRE), and
- g) resource availability (RA).

These seven FRs are the foundation for defining control system security capability levels. Defining security capability levels for the control system component is the goal and objective of this document as opposed to SL-T or achieved SLs (SL-A), which are out of scope.

NOTE 1 Refer to IEC 62443-2-1 [1] for an equivalent set of non-technical, program-related, capability requirements necessary for fully achieving a SL-T(control system).

NOTE 2 The trademarks and trade names mentioned in this document are given for the convenience of users of this document. This information does not constitute an endorsement by IEC of the products named.

#### 2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC TS 62443-1-1, *Industrial communication networks – Network and system security – Part 1-1: Terminology, concepts and models*

IEC 62443-3-3:2013, *Industrial communication networks – Network and system security – Part 3-3: System security requirements and security levels*

IEC 62443-4-1, *Security for industrial automation and control systems – Part 4-1: Secure product development lifecycle requirements*