



BSI Standards Publication

Power systems management and associated information exchange — Data and communications security

Part 5: Security for IEC 60870-5
and derivatives

National foreword

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The UK participation in its preparation was entrusted to Technical Committee PEL/57, Power systems management and associated information exchange.

A list of organizations represented on this committee can be obtained on request to its secretary.

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

**Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security –
Part 5: Security for IEC 60870-5 and derivatives**

INTERNATIONAL
ELECTROTECHNICAL
COMMISSION

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INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

POWER SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE – DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY –

Part 5: Security for IEC 60870-5 and derivatives

FOREWORD

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- the required support cannot be obtained for the publication of an International Standard, despite repeated efforts, or
- the subject is still under technical development or where, for any other reason, there is the future but no immediate possibility of an agreement on an International Standard.

Technical specifications are subject to review within three years of publication to decide whether they can be transformed into International Standards.

IEC/TS 62351-5, which is a technical specification, has been prepared by IEC technical committee 57: Power systems management and associated information exchange.

This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2009. It constitutes a technical revision. The primary changes in the second edition are:

- adds the capability to change Update Keys remotely;
- adds security statistics to aid in detecting attacks;
- adds measures to avoid being forced to change session keys too often;
- discards unexpected messages more often as possible attacks;
- adds to the list of permitted security algorithms;
- adds new rules for calculating challenge sequence numbers.

The text of this technical specification is based on the following documents:

Enquiry draft	Report on voting
57/1204/DTS	57/1282/RVC

Full information on the voting for the approval of this technical specification can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

Capitalization has been used in the text of this specification to formally identify the most important components of the described security mechanism. These components include: 1) data items e.g. Update Keys, Session Keys; 2) message names, e.g. Challenge, Reply, Aggressive Mode Request; 3) event names e.g. Reply Timeout, Rx Invalid Reply; 4) state names, e.g. Security Idle, Wait for Reply; and 5) statistics e.g. Authentication Failures, Unexpected Messages.

A list of all the parts in the IEC 62351 series published under the general title *Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security*, can be found on the IEC website.

The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC web site under "<http://webstore.iec.ch>" in the data related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be

- transformed into an International standard,
- reconfirmed,
- withdrawn,
- replaced by a revised edition, or
- amended.

A bilingual version of this publication may be issued at a later date.

**POWER SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
 AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE –
 DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY –**

Part 5: Security for IEC 60870-5 and derivatives

1 Scope and object

This part of IEC 62351 specifies messages, procedures and algorithms for securing the operation of all protocols based on or derived from IEC 60870-5: Telecontrol equipment and systems – Transmission protocols. This Technical Specification applies to at least those protocols listed in Table 1.

Table 1 – Scope of application to standards

Number	Name
IEC 60870-5-101	Companion standard for basic telecontrol tasks
IEC 60870-5-102	Companion standard for the transmission of integrated totals in electric power systems
IEC 60870-5-103	Companion standard for the informative interface of telecontrol equipment
IEC 60870-5-104	Network access for IEC 60870-5-101 using standard transport profiles
DNP3	Distributed Network Protocol (based on IEC 60870-5 through IEC 60870-5 and controlled by the DNP Users Group)

The initial audience for this Technical Specification is intended to be the members of the working groups developing the protocols listed in Table 1. For the measures described in this specification to take effect, they must be accepted and referenced by the specifications for the protocols themselves. This document is written to enable that process.

The subsequent audience for this specification is intended to be the developers of products that implement these protocols.

Portions of this specification may also be of use to managers and executives in order to understand the purpose and requirements of the work.

This part of IEC/TS 62351 focuses only on application layer authentication and security issues arising from such authentication. Other security concerns – in particular, protection from eavesdropping or man-in-the-middle attacks through the use of encryption – are considered to be outside the scope. Encryption may be added through the use of this specification with other specifications.

This document is organized working from the general to the specific, as follows:

- Clauses 2 through 4 provide background terms, definitions, and references.
- Clause 5 describes the problems this specification is intended to address.
- Clause 6 describes the mechanism generically without reference to a specific protocol.
- Clauses 7 and 8 describe the mechanism more precisely and are the primary normative part of this specification.
- Clause 9 describes a few particular implementation issues that are special cases.
- Clause 10 describes the requirements for other standards referencing this specification.