



BSI Standards Publication

**Nuclear power plants —
Instrumentation and control
important to safety — Use
and selection of wireless
devices to be integrated in
systems important to safety**

National foreword

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TECHNICAL REPORT



**Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control important to safety –
Use and selection of wireless devices to be integrated in systems
important to safety**

INTERNATIONAL
ELECTROTECHNICAL
COMMISSION

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INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

**NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS –
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL IMPORTANT TO SAFETY –
USE AND SELECTION OF WIRELESS DEVICES TO BE
INTEGRATED IN SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY**

FOREWORD

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IEC TR 62918, which is a technical report, has been prepared by subcommittee 45A: Instrumentation, control and electrical systems of nuclear facilities, of IEC technical committee 45: Nuclear instrumentation.

The text of this technical report is based on the following documents:

| | |
|---------------|------------------|
| Enquiry draft | Report on voting |
| 45A/947/DTR | 45A/963/RVC |

Full information on the voting for the approval of this technical report can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC web site under "<http://webstore.iec.ch>" in the data related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be

- reconfirmed,
- withdrawn,
- replaced by a revised edition, or
- amended.

A bilingual version of this publication may be issued at a later date.

IMPORTANT – Le logo "colour inside" qui se trouve sur la page de couverture de cette publication indique qu'elle contient des couleurs qui sont considérées comme utiles à une bonne compréhension de son contenu. Les utilisateurs devraient, par conséquent, imprimer cette publication en utilisant une imprimante couleur.

INTRODUCTION

a) Technical background, main issues and organisation of the Standard

The ad hoc meeting of the IEC Technical Working Group on Nuclear Power Plant Control and Instrumentation, held in Yokohama in May 2009, resulted in the recommendation to develop a technical report addressing the applicability of incorporating wireless technology throughout nuclear power plant systems, regardless of the categorizations such as non-safety, important to availability and important to safety.

This technical report addresses this recommendation and one of its main objectives is to pave the way for the development of a standard on the topic. The technical report addresses concerns regarding the application, safety and security of integrating wireless technologies into the systems of nuclear power plants. It reviews the motivation for use of wireless applications in nuclear power plants, wireless technology considerations, and the feasibility of incorporating wireless technology in nuclear power plants.

It is intended that this Technical Report be used by operators of NPPs (utilities, systems evaluators and by licensors).

b) Situation of the current Technical Report in the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series

IEC 62918 as a technical report is a fourth level IEC SC 45A document.

For more details on the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series, see item d) of this introduction.

c) Recommendations and limitations regarding the application of this Technical Report

It is important to note that a technical report is entirely informative in nature. It gathers data collected from different origins and it establishes no requirements.

d) Description of the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series and relationships with other IEC documents and other bodies' documents (IAEA, ISO)

The top-level document of the IEC SC 45A standard series is IEC 61513. It provides general requirements for I&C systems and equipment that are used to perform functions important to safety in NPPs. IEC 61513 structures the IEC SC 45A standard series.

IEC 61513 refers directly to other IEC SC 45A standards for general topics related to categorization of functions and classification of systems, qualification, separation of systems, defence against common cause failure, software aspects of computer-based systems, hardware aspects of computer-based systems, and control room design. The standards referenced directly at this second level should be considered together with IEC 61513 as a consistent document set.

At a third level, IEC SC 45A standards not directly referenced by IEC 61513 are standards related to specific equipment, technical methods, or specific activities. Usually these documents, which make reference to second-level documents for general topics, can be used on their own.

A fourth level extending the IEC SC 45A standard series, corresponds to the Technical Reports which are not normative.

IEC 61513 has adopted a presentation format similar to the basic safety publication IEC 61508 with an overall safety life-cycle framework and a system life-cycle framework. Regarding nuclear safety, it provides the interpretation of the general requirements of IEC 61508-1, IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-4, for the nuclear application sector, regarding nuclear safety. In this framework IEC 60880 and IEC 62138 correspond to IEC 61508-3 for the nuclear application sector. IEC 61513 refers to ISO as well as to IAEA GS-R-3 and IAEA GS-G-3.1 and IAEA GS-G-3.5 for topics related to quality assurance (QA).

The IEC SC 45A standards series consistently implements and details the principles and basic safety aspects provided in the IAEA code on the safety of NPPs and in the IAEA safety series, in particular the Requirements SSR-2/1, establishing safety requirements related to the design of Nuclear Power Plants, and the Safety Guide NS-G-1.3 dealing with instrumentation and control systems important to safety in Nuclear Power Plants. The

terminology and definitions used by SC 45A standards are consistent with those used by the IAEA.

NOTE It is assumed that for the design of I&C systems in NPPs that implement conventional safety functions (e.g. to address worker safety, asset protection, chemical hazards, process energy hazards) international or national standards would be applied, that are based on the requirements of a standard such as IEC 61508.

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NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS – INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL IMPORTANT TO SAFETY – USE AND SELECTION OF WIRELESS DEVICES TO BE INTEGRATED IN SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY

1 Scope

This Technical Report describes the state of wireless technology for industrial applications in fossil and chemical plants and discusses the specific issues to be addressed in order to apply wireless technologies to nuclear power plants.

The review of the technology behind wireless communication and the status of existing implementations are described in Clauses 7 and 8, respectively. Issues associated with wireless implementations in nuclear facilities are discussed in Clause 10, and final conclusions are presented in Clause 11 of this Technical Report.

2 Normative references

The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC 61508 (all parts), *Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems*

IEC 61513, *Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control for systems important to safety – General requirements for systems*

IEC 62591, *Industrial communication networks – Wireless communication network and communication profiles – WirelessHART™*

IEC PAS 62734, *Industrial communication networks – Fieldbus specifications – Wireless systems for industrial automation: process control and related applications (Based on ISA 100.11a)*

3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

3.1

access control

protection of system resources against unauthorized access; a process by which use of system resources is regulated according to a security policy and is permitted by only authorized entities (users, programs, processes, or other systems) according to that policy

3.2

authenticate

verify the identity of a user, user device, or other entity, or the integrity of data stored, transmitted, or otherwise exposed to unauthorized modification in an information system, or to establish the validity of a transmission