



BSI Standards Publication

Security for industrial automation and control systems

Part 2-3: Patch management in the IACS environment

National foreword

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TECHNICAL REPORT



**Security for industrial automation and control systems –
Part 2-3: Patch management in the IACS environment**

INTERNATIONAL
ELECTROTECHNICAL
COMMISSION

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INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

SECURITY FOR INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION
AND CONTROL SYSTEMS –

Part 2-3: Patch management in the IACS environment

FOREWORD

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Technical Report IEC 62443-2-3 has been prepared by ISA Technical Committee 99 in partnership with IEC technical committee 65: Industrial-process measurement, control and automation.

The text of this standard is based on the following documents:

Enquiry draft	Report on voting
65/554/DTR	65/564/RVC

Full information on the voting for the approval of this technical report can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

A list of all parts in the IEC 62443 series, published under the general title *Security for industrial automation and control systems*, can be found on the IEC website.

The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC website under "<http://webstore.iec.ch>" in the data related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be

- reconfirmed,
- withdrawn,
- replaced by a revised edition, or
- amended.

A bilingual version of this publication may be issued at a later date.

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INTRODUCTION

Cyber security is an increasingly important topic in modern organizations. Many organizations involved in information technology (IT) and business have been concerned with cyber security for many years and have well-established information security management systems (ISMS) in place as defined by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), in ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002. These management systems provide an organization with a well-established method for protecting its assets from cyber-attacks.

Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) suppliers and owners are using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology developed for business systems in their everyday processes. This provides an increased opportunity for cyber-attack against the IACS equipment, since COTS systems are more widely known and used. There has also been a new interest in ICS security research that has uncovered numerous device vulnerabilities as well. Successful attacks against industrial systems may lead to health, safety and environmental (HSE) consequences.

Organizations may try to use the business cyber security strategy to address security for IACS without understanding the consequences. While many of these solutions can be applied to IACS, they need to be applied in the correct way to eliminate unintended consequences.

This technical report addresses the patch management aspect of IACS cyber security. Patch management is part of a comprehensive cyber security strategy that increases cyber security through the installation of patches, also called software updates, software upgrades, firmware upgrades, service packs, hotfixes, basic input output system (BIOS) updates and other digital electronic program updates that resolve bugs, operability, reliability and cyber security vulnerabilities. This technical report introduces to the reader many of the problems and industry concerns associated with IACS patch management for asset owners and IACS product suppliers. It also describes the impacts poor patch management can have on the reliability and/or operability of the IACS.

SECURITY FOR INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS –

Part 2-3: Patch management in the IACS environment

1 Scope

This part of IEC 62443, which is a Technical Report, describes requirements for asset owners and industrial automation and control system (IACS) product suppliers that have established and are now maintaining an IACS patch management program.

This Technical Report recommends a defined format for the distribution of information about security patches from asset owners to IACS product suppliers, a definition of some of the activities associated with the development of the patch information by IACS product suppliers and deployment and installation of the patches by asset owners. The exchange format and activities are defined for use in security related patches; however, it may also be applicable for non-security related patches or updates.

The Technical Report does not differentiate between patches made available for the operating systems (OSs), applications or devices. It does not differentiate between the product suppliers that supply the infrastructure components or the IACS applications; it provides guidance for all patches applicable to the IACS. Additionally, the type of patch can be for the resolution of bugs, reliability issues, operability issues or security vulnerabilities.

NOTE 1 This Technical Report does not provide guidance on the ethics and approaches for the discovery and disclosure of security vulnerabilities affecting IACS. This is a general issue outside the scope of this report.

NOTE 2 This Technical Report does not provide guidance on the mitigation of vulnerabilities in the period between when the vulnerability is discovered and the time that the patch resolving the vulnerability is created. For guidance on multiple countermeasures to mitigate security risks as part of an IACS security management system (IACS-SMS), refer to, Annexes B.4.5, B.4.6 and B.8.5 in this Technical Report and other documents in the IEC 62443 series.

2 Normative references

The following documents in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC TS 62443-1-1, *Industrial communication networks – Network and system security – Part 1-1: Terminology, concepts and models*

IEC 62443-2-1, *Industrial communication networks – Network and system security – Part 2-1: Establishing an industrial automation and control system security program*

3 Terms, definitions, abbreviated terms and acronyms

3.1 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in the normative references specified in Clause 2, as well as the following, apply: