

Australian/New Zealand Standard™

**Failure modes and effects analysis
(FMEA and FMECA)**



AS/NZS IEC 60812:2020

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Australian/New Zealand Standard™

**Failure modes and effects analysis
(FMEA and FMECA)**

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Preface

This Standard was prepared by the Joint Standards Australia/Standards New Zealand Committee QR-005, Dependability, to supersede AS IEC 60812—2008, *Analysis techniques for system reliability — Procedure for failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)*.

The objective of this Standard is to explain how failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), including the failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) variant, is planned, performed, documented and maintained.

The purpose of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is to establish how items or processes might fail to perform their function so that any required treatments could be identified. An FMEA provides a systematic method for identifying modes of failure together with their effects on the item or process, both locally and globally. It may also include identifying the causes of failure modes. Failure modes can be prioritized to support decisions about treatment. Where the ranking of criticality involves at least the severity of consequences, and often other measures of importance, the analysis is known as failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA).

This document is applicable to hardware, software, processes including human action, and their interfaces, in any combination.

An FMEA can be used in a safety analysis, for regulatory and other purposes, but this being a generic Standard, does not give specific guidance for safety application.

This Standard is identical with, and has been reproduced from, IEC 60812:2018, *Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA and FMECA)*.

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INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA and FMECA)

FOREWORD

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International Standard IEC 60812 has been prepared by IEC technical committee 56: Dependability.

This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition published in 2006. This edition constitutes a technical revision.

This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:

- a) the normative text is generic and covers all applications;
- b) examples of applications for safety, automotive, software and (service) processes have been added as informative annexes;
- c) tailoring the FMEA for different applications is described;
- d) different reporting formats are described, including a database information system;
- e) alternative means of calculating risk priority numbers (RPN) have been added;
- f) a criticality matrix based method has been added;
- g) the relationship to other dependability analysis methods have been described.

The text of this International Standard is based on the following documents:

FDIS	Report on voting
56/1775/FDIS	56/1782/RVD

Full information on the voting for the approval of this International Standard can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This document has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

The committee has decided that the contents of this document will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC website under "<http://webstore.iec.ch>" in the data related to the specific document. At this date, the document will be

- reconfirmed,
- withdrawn,
- replaced by a revised edition, or
- amended.

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INTRODUCTION

Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is a systematic method of evaluating an item or process to identify the ways in which it might potentially fail, and the effects of the mode of failure upon the performance of the item or process and on the surrounding environment and personnel. This document describes how to perform an FMEA.

The purpose of performing an FMEA is to support decisions that reduce the likelihood of failures and their effects, and thus contribute to improved outcomes either directly or through other analyses. Such improved outcomes include, but are not limited to, improved reliability, reduced environmental impact, reduced procurement and operating costs, and enhanced business reputation.

FMEA can be adapted to meet the needs of any industry or organization. FMEA is applicable to hardware, software, processes, human action and their interfaces, in any combination.

FMEA can be carried out several times in the lifetime for the same item or process. A preliminary analysis can be conducted during the early stages of design and planning, followed by a more detailed analysis when more information is available. FMEA can include existing controls, or recommended treatments, to reduce the likelihood or the effects of a failure mode. In the case of a closed loop analysis, FMEA allows for evaluation of the effectiveness of any treatment.

FMEA can be tailored and applied in different ways depending on the objectives.

Failure modes may be prioritized according to their importance. The prioritization can be based on a ranking of the severity alone, or this can be combined with other measures of importance. When failure modes are prioritized, the process is referred to as failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA). This document uses the term FMEA to include FMECA.

This document gives general guidance on how to plan, perform, document and maintain an FMEA by:

- a) describing the principles;
- b) providing the steps in analysis;
- c) giving examples of the documentation;
- d) providing example applications.

FMEA may be used in a certification or assurance process. For example, FMEA may be used in safety analysis for regulatory purposes but, as this document is a generic standard, it does not specifically address safety.

FMEA should be conducted in a manner that is consistent with any legislation, which is in effect within the scope of FMEA, or the type of risks involved.

Primary users of this document are those who are leading or participating in the analysis.

FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA and FMECA)

1 Scope

This document explains how failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), including the failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) variant, is planned, performed, documented and maintained.

The purpose of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is to establish how items or processes might fail to perform their function so that any required treatments could be identified. An FMEA provides a systematic method for identifying modes of failure together with their effects on the item or process, both locally and globally. It may also include identifying the causes of failure modes. Failure modes can be prioritized to support decisions about treatment. Where the ranking of criticality involves at least the severity of consequences, and often other measures of importance, the analysis is known as failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA).

This document is applicable to hardware, software, processes including human action, and their interfaces, in any combination.

An FMEA can be used in a safety analysis, for regulatory and other purposes, but this being a generic standard, does not give specific guidance for safety applications.

2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC 60050-192, *International electrotechnical vocabulary – Part 192: Dependability* (available at <http://www.electropedia.org>)

3 Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms

3.1 Terms and definitions

For the purpose of this document, the terms and definitions given in IEC 60050-192 and the following apply.

ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

- IEC Electropedia: available at <http://www.electropedia.org/>
- ISO Online browsing platform: available at <http://www.iso.org/obp>

3.1.1

failure mode

DEPRECATED: fault mode
manner in which failure occurs

Note 1 to entry: A failure mode may be determined by the function lost or other state transition that occurred.